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THE APPLICABILITY OF MIRANDA 
WARNINGS TO NON-FELONY OFFENSES: 
IS THE PROPER STANDARD "CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION" OR "SEVERITY OF 
THE OFFENSE"? 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda v. 
Arizona, which required law enforcement officers to inform criminal 
suspects of their fifth amendment right against self-incrimination I prior 
to the initiation of custodial interrogation. 2 Although the Supreme Court 
has redefined and sharpened the focus of the Miranda decision on 
numerous occasions, 3 it has not yet specifically addressed the 
applicability of the Miranda warnings to non-felony offenses such as 
misdemeanors and traffic infractions. 4 
Although the majority of states have required that police give 
Miranda warnings to suspects prior to custodial questioning for any 
offense, 5 several states have held that the warnings are not necessary 
I. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court declared that 
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the 
authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against 
self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect 
the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person 
of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously 
honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any ques-
tioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against 
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if 
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning 
if he so desires. 
384 U.S. at 478-79. 
3. See generally G. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99. 
4. See, e.g., Capler v. City of Greenville, 207 So. 2d 339 (Miss.) (finding warnings not necessar-
ily required for misdemeanors), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 941 (1968); State v. Lewin, 163 N.J. Super. 
439, 395 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1978), certification denied, 81 N.J. 58, 404 A.2d 1157, cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 905 (1979) (denying certiorari over the dissent of three justices, when statements elicited 
without benefit of Miranda warnings following drunk driving arrest were later used in prosecu-
tion for death by auto); State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969) (holding Miranda 
warnings not required in misdemeanor interrogations), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970); State 
v. Darnell, 8 Wash. App. 627, 508 P.2d 613 (requiring Miranda warning for all custodial inter-
rogations; traffic violation interrogation not necessarily custodial), cert. denied, 414 U.S. I 112 
(1973). 
5. See, e.g., Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971) (requiring Miranda 
warnings in misdemeanor arrests); State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967) (requir-
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for misdemeanors, traffic violations, or both. 6 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a decision overturning Ohio case 
law, recently held that vehicular misdemeanors were within the scope 
of Miranda. 1 This holding directly conflicts with a prior Fourth Cir-
cuit decision that Miranda warnings are not required for misdemeanor 
traffic offenses. 8 The United States Supreme Court recently granted 
certiorari to resolve this issue.9 
This Note argues that the proper standard for determining the 
necessity of the Miranda warnings for any offense is the existence of 
custodial interrogation. When interrogation for non-felony offenses 
takes place in a custodial atmosphere, Miranda warnings should be 
required, as they are for more serious offenses. Part I summarizes the 
two basic approaches taken by courts that have confronted the ques-
tion of the applicability of the Miranda warnings to non-felony of-
ing Miranda warnings whenever an arrest is made for any offense); People v. Ceccone, 260 Cal. 
App. 2d 886, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968) (requiring Miranda for custodial interrogation in traffic 
offenses); State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 178 N.W.2d 888 (1970) (requiring Miranda when an 
officer determines to take a person into custody); People v. McLaren, 55 Misc. 2d 676, 285 
N.Y.S.2d 991 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1967) (applying Miranda to all custodial interrogations, 
including police "interview" after D.W.l. arrest); State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 
843 (1974) (holding that Miranda applies to custodial interrogation for such offenses as public 
intoxication and D.W.I.); State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980) (holding warnings necessary 
for traffic offenses when custodial interrogation occurs); State v. Teafatiller, 64 Or. App. 612, 
669 P.2d 379 (1983) (requiring Miranda warnings for misdemeanor custodial interrogations, even 
if suspect is subsequently cited and released, rather than arrested); Commonwealth v. Bonser, 
215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969) (applying Miranda to misdemeanors, regardless whether 
found in the penal or vehicle codes); Newberry v. State, 552 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) 
(requiring Miranda for all custodial interrogations); State v. Darnell, 8 Wash. App. 627, 508 
P.2d 613 (requiring Miranda for custodial interrogation in traffic offenses), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1112 (1973); State v. Sunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129,227 N.W.2d 727 (1975) (requiring full panoply 
of Miranda warnings when police interrogate a driver as to his -condition while driving). 
6. See State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968) (holding warnings not necessary in custodial 
interrogations for traffic offenses, absent a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant); State 
v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1971) (rejecting a requirement for a Miranda warning 
when offense charged is a simple misdemeanor), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972); State v. Angelo, 
251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 710 (1967) (holding that statements made in misdemeanor cases can 
be used without necessity of informing the suspect of his right to counsel); Ca pier v. City of 
Greenville, 207 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1968) (holding Miranda not required in misdemeanors), cert. 
denied, 392 U.S. 941 (1968); State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972) (holding Miranda not 
necessary for traffic violations); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. I, 268 A.2d I (1970) (holding Miranda 
not applicable to motor vehicle violations); State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 
(1969) (not requiring Miranda in interrogations for misdemeanors), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 
(1970); Byers v. Oklahoma City, 497 P.2d 1302 (Okla. 1972) (requiring warnings only in cases 
leading to a felony charge). 
7. McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984) (No. 83-710); see also Benedlow v. United States, 418 F.2d 
42, 47 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum indicating Miranda warnings may bt> required for questioning 
regarding misdemeanor of displaying fraudulently altered license), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970). 
8. Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976). 
9. Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984) (No. 83-710), granting cert. to McCarty 
v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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fenses. Part Ill argues that neither the rationale for the Miranda doc-
trine nor the roots of the fifth amendment support a distinction based 
on the severity of the offense with which the suspect is charged. Part 
II also distinguishes the Miranda privileges from other areas of the 
law where such distinctions based on severity of the crime are valid. 
Part III considers how the component parts of the custodial interroga-
tion standard would work in practice in minor offense investigations, 
and how Miranda warnings will not unduly impair investigations for 
non-felony offenses. Part III concludes that there are sound reasons 
for imposing this minor burden on the police in order to protect the 
fifth amendment rights of non-felony suspects. 
I. APPROACHES To THE APPLICATION OF Miranda WARNINGS IN 
NON-FELONY INVESTIGATIONS 
Courts addressing the issue of whether Miranda applies to non-felony 
offenses have generally taken one of two basic approaches to the issue. 
These two conflicting approaches, and the outcomes suggested by each, 
are exemplified by the contrasting reasoning of the two federal appellate 
courts that have reached opposite conclusions as to the necessity of 
the Miranda warnings for misdemeanor traffic offenses. 
A. The Nature of the Offense 
Most jurisdictions that have held that Miranda is not required for 
certain non-felony offenses have focused on the nature of the viola-
tion for which the suspect was interrogated. 10 In Clay v. Riddle, 11 for 
example, the Fourth Circuit held that Miranda warnings were not re-
quired for misdemeanor traffic offenders. The defendant was arrested 
IO. See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[T)he unlawful incident 
was a commonplace event - a traffic offense - a breach of the law to which we believe the 
[Miranda] decision does not extend."); State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848, 850 (Del. 1968) ("There 
are practical reasons why motor vehicle offenses should be treated somewhat differently ... 
than most other offenses."); State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1971) ("To hold Miranda 
warnings applicable to simple misdemeanors would unduly interfere with proper law enforcement 
in that area ... . "),cert.denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972); State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 255, 203 So. 
2d 710, 711 (1967) (misdemeanors do not require the same "elaborate, strict, highly formalized 
procedural safeguards" as felonies); Capler v. City of Greenville, 207 So. 2d 339, 341 (Miss. 
1968) ("We consider this question in light of the fact that only a misdemeanor is involved"), 
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 941 (1968); State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Mo. 1972) ("Miranda 
does not say that the rule shall be applied in cases involving so-called minor offenses"); State 
v. Macuk, 57 N.J. I, 268 A.2d I (1970) (holding that motor vehicle violations, as "petty of-
fenses," are not serious enough to require Miranda); State v. Pyle, I 9 Ohio St. 2d 64, 67, 249 
N.E.2d 826, 827 (1969) ("Investigative procedures ordinarily followed with respect to misde-
meanors ... differ markedly from the investigative procedures ordinarily followed with respect 
to felonies."), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). 
11. 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976). 
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for the misdemeanor of driving while under the influence of alcohol. 12 
During transport to a hospital for a breath test, the def end ant made 
an incriminating statement in response to a question asked without 
Miranda warnings. Significantly, the prosecution later used the state-
ment to support his felony conviction under the state "habitual of-
fender" statute, 13 for which the defendant was sentenced to imprison-
ment for one year. The Fourth Circuit cited a number of prior state 
cases from several jurisdictions which gave two general justifications 
for rejecting claims such as Clay's request for habeas corpus relief: 14 
(1) a variety of theoretical assumptions supporting the assertion that 
the scope of Miranda did not extend to minor offenses; 15 and (2) 
arguments that the application of Miranda warnings to minor offenses 
would overburden law enforcement, 16 sometimes balanced against the 
minor consequences resulting from convictions for non-felonies. 11 This 
approach, which requires a crime-by-crime determination of whether 
Miranda warnings are required, 18 has led to discrepancies among the 
jurisdictions which adopt it. The approach has also not created any 
single bright-line test to determine when Miranda applies, 19 nor has 
12. VA. CODE §§ 18.1-54, -55 (1950). 
13. VA. CODE §§ 46.1-387.2, -387.6, -387.8 (1950) (making it a felony for an "habitual 
offender" to drive on the highway). 
14. 541 F.2d at 457-58. 
15. Courts have based theoretical distinctions on historical differences between minor of-
fenses and more serious crimes, State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 391, 226 A.2d 16, 23 
(App. Div.), aff'd, 50 N.J. 361,235 A.2d 193 (1967), and on a general reluctance to expansively 
interpret court-made rules. State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 66-67, 249 N.E.2d 826, 827 (1969), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). Furthermore, courts have reasoned that the primary purpose 
of Miranda was to proscribe "the lengthy incommunicado [police interrogation] seeking to 'sweat 
out' a confession" that supposedly occurred in felony, but not in misdemeanor, interrogations. 
State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 16, 268 A.2d 1, 9 (1970); see infra notes 96-97 and accompanying 
text; see also State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Mo. 1972). 
16. Several cases point to the vast numbers of traffic infractions that occur in their respective 
jurisdictions and imply that the justice system would grind to a halt if suspects cotild invoke 
Miranda rights. See, e.g., State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848, 850 (Del. 1968) (noting that there were 
1087 arrests for drunk driving in Delaware in 1966); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. I, 17,268 A.2d 
I, 9 (1970) (stating that 726,763 non-parking traffic complaints were filed in New Jersey in 
1968-69). 
17. See, e.g., State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 16, 268 A.2d 1, 9 (1970) ("The violations involved 
are not serious enough in their consequences to warrant the time consuming interference which 
would result to effective law enforcement ... in petty offense cases"). 
18. For example, this determination might depend upon classifications regarding the seriousness 
of the crime that vary greatly from state to state, such as whether the offense was classified 
in the traffic code, see, e.g., State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968), or as a "simple misde-
meanor," e.g., State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 
(1972), or as a "petty offense," e.g., State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1,268 A.2d I (1970), or as any 
misdemeanor, e.g., State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 1007 (1970); see also infra note 20. 
19. The confusion as to the proper line to be drawn may be present in the case to which 
the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari. Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984) 
(No. 83-710). In this case, 716 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit explicitly over-
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it proven a consistent, workable test in practice. As a result of the 
differing lines drawn by courts focusing on the nature of the crime, 
interrogation for a given infraction may be subject to the Miranda re-
quirements in one jurisdiction and not in another. This is due to the 
disparate statutory classifications of the offense in various jurisdic-
tions, as well as the discretion of the courts in determining whether 
or not to apply the Miranda warnings to that class of offense. 20 
Furthermore, linking Miranda warnings to the seriousness of the of-
fense gives added significance to the infraction with which the suspect 
is initially charged. Miranda warnings could be denied if the investigating 
police officer initially decides to charge a suspect with a non-felony 
or vehicular offense, regardless of other, more serious charges arising 
out of the incident that may be pursued at a later date. 21 A federal 
district court in the Fourth Circuit severely criticized Clay for allowing 
this possible result. 22 There may also be fundamental constitutional · 
questions involved if, for example, prior misdemeanor convictions ob-
tained with the aid of non-Miranda confessions are used to increase 
the degree of offense or the sentence for subsequent convictions. 23 
ruled State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970), 
which held Miranda inapplicable to all misdemeanors. The question presented on certiorari, 
however, only challenges the applicability of the warnings to vehicular misdemeanors. See 52 
U.S.L.W. 3427 (Nov. 29, 1983). 
20. For example, by holding that Miranda does not apply to petty offenses under municipal 
ordinances, the court in County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), 
exempted a large class of offenses from the Miranda requirement, including drunk driving. On 
the other hand, in a different jurisdiction the same infraction might be found in the state code, 
with a relatively severe punishment. In Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 
675 (1969), the court, noting the potential seriousness of the legislatively prescribed punishment, 
held the Miranda warnings applicable to custodial interrogation for misdemeanor drunk driving. 
New Jersey courts have taken a somewhat different approach by expressly altering their defini-
tion of "crime" by declaring that certain offenses are mereiy "quasi-criminal," and thus not 
subject to the same Miranda standards as "criminal" offenses. See State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. 
Super. 380, 236 A.2d 16 (App. Div.), afj'd, 50 N.J. 361, 235 A.2d 193 (1967) (citing State v. 
Maier, 13 N.J. 235, 99 A.2d 21 (1953), which drew this distinction between crimes and petty 
offenses); see also infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text. 
21. There have been instances, such as Clay, in which defendants charged with non-felony 
offenses have had their incriminating statements made witliout benefit of Miranda warnings used 
against them in subsequent felony prosecutions stemming from the same incident. See infra note 
128. 
22. In United States v. Schultz, 442 F. Supp. 176 (D. Md. 1977), the defendact, who was 
initially stopped because of apparent erratic driving, confessed to smoking marijuana, a misde-
meanor. The court pointed out that the officer's further inquiries regarding whether the defen-
dant had more marijuana in the vehicle could have led to felony charges, if the amount pos-
sessed was large enough. During further interrogation, the defendant admitted to possessing an 
illegal weapon, for which he was tried in federal court. In granting defendant's motion to supress 
his statements, the court attempted to distinguish Clay by noting that the interrogation went 
beyond the "mold" of a traffic offense when the officer asked about drugs. In addition, the 
court specifically endorsed the dissent's reasoning in Clay. 
23. See infra notes 130-132 and acocompanying text. 
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B. The Existence of Custodial Interrogation 
The second method of analysis used by courts focuses on whether 
the incriminating statements were the product of custodial interroga-
tion, regardless of the nature of the offense for which the suspect was 
interrogated. 24 The Sixth Circuit adopted such an approach in McCarty 
v. Herdman 25 by applying a bright-line test mandating Miranda warnings 
whenever law enforcement authorities engage in custodial interroga-
tion, regardless of the nature of the offense. In McCarty, the defen-
dant was suspected of driving while intoxicated. He was arrested, 
transported to the county jail, and given an intoxilyzer test, which 
showed no alcohol in his system. During the accompanying question-
ing without Miranda warnings for the purpose of filling out an "Alcohol 
Influence Report,'' however, McCarty made incriminating statements 
about smoking marijuana. The trial court refused to exclude these in-
criminating statements, and McCarty pleaded nolo contendere to driving 
while intoxicated, a first degree misdemeanor. 26 He was sentenced to 
ninety days in jail, eighty of which were suspended. 
24. See, e.g., McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Miranda warn-
ings must be given to all individuals prior to custodial interrogation, whether the offense in-
vestigated be a felony or a misdemeanor traffic offense .... The privilege against self-incrimination 
is an enduring right, undiminished by the number of people who enjoy it or the frequency of 
its exercise.") (emphasis in original), cert. granted sub nom. Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 
(1984) (No. 83-710); Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 552, 479 P.2d 685, 695 (1971) 
("Miranda warnings must be given when the officer determines that ... an arrest for a misde-
meanor or felony is to be made. At this time the person is being 'deprived of his freedom of 
action in [a) significant way"') (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477); People v. McLaren, 55 
Misc. 2d 676, 677, 285 N.Y.S.2d 991, 992-93 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1967) ("[S]ince ... 
defendant was not informed of [his Miranda) rights prior to his [custodial] interrogation .. 
. the defendant's ... responses to the queries derived from the [forty-four question drunk driving 
questionaire) ... are supressed out of hand"); State v. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129, 134, 227 N.W.2d 
727, 730 (1975) ("We believe that the state's argument that [in drunk driving cases] no criminal 
proceeding is involved ... is without merit. If the police did in fact interrogate the driver as 
to her driving or intoxication ... the full panoply of Miranda warnings would be required"); 
cf. State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967) (stating that Miranda is required for 
custodial interrogation for misdemeanors as well as felonies; however, statements admissible because 
suspect not yet in custody); State v. Roberti, 293 Or. 236, 646 P.2d 1341 (in petition to supress 
non-Miranda confessions stemming from drunk driving investigation, court focusing on whether 
there was custodial interrogation), rev'g on rehearing 293 Or. 59, 644 P .2d I 104 (1982), petition 
for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. (Aug. 20, 1982) (No. 82-315); Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 
I I 68 (Utah 1983) (not requiring warnings in investigatory setting, but stating that accused drunk 
driver must be given Miranda warnings if setting of interrogation is custodial). But see Com-
monwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 460 n.5, 258 A.2d 675, 680 n.5 (1969) (holding that 
one accused of a misdemeanor is entitled to Miranda prior to custodial interrogation, regardless 
whether the offense is found in the Penal or Vehicle Codes, but distinguishing, in a footnote, 
drunk driving in Pennsylvania for Miranda purposes from drunk driving in states that hold Miranda 
inapplicable to drunk driving, by the harsher sentences available in Pennsylvania). 
25. 716 F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 
S. Ct. 697 (1984) (83-710). The case entered the federal courts on a petition for habeas corpus 
relief, which was denied by the district court. 
26. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page 1982). 
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In granting McCarty's petition for habeas corpus, the Sixth Circuit 
focused on the necessity of the Miranda procedural safeguards to pro-
tect the fifth, amendment privilege against self-incrimination during 
custodial interrogation, and explicitly rejected limiting the scope of 
Miranda by the nature of the crime being investigated. 21 Significantly, 
even the dissenting judge agreed with the majority that the suspect's 
stationhouse confessions fell within the purview of Miranda. 28 His 
disagreement with the majority's holding was essentially factual: because 
the suspect made similar incriminating statements at the scene, the 
dissenting judge found the stationhouse admissions immaterial to the 
conviction. 29 The central proposition of this Note is that, possible fac-
tual peculiarities of McCarty notwithstanding, 30 both the majority and 
dissent in that case reached the correct legal conclusion that the ap-
plicability of the Miranda doctrine depends on the existence of custodial 
interrogation, rather than the type of offense being investigated. 
II. THE BASIS FOR THE Miranda DOCTRINE AND THE HISTORY OF 
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION SUPPORT WARNINGS 
FOR ALL CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 
A. The Miranda Rationale 
The theoretical justification for the Miranda decision is that custodial 
interrogation of a suspect by law enforcement personnel contains "in-
27. The court stated that: 
Miranda ... creates procedural safeguards to secure the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. Although felony offenses were specifically in issue in Miranda 
and its companion cases, the language of the opinion does not limit the safeguards 
to individuals suspected of felonies. Similarly, yet more importantly, the language of 
the fifth amendment does not limit the privilege against self-incrimination to those 
charged with felonies. It has never been suggested that a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor could be compelled to testify against himself. To so argue would be both 
illogical and inconsistent. "[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
... serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is cur-
tailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves." We 
hold that Miranda warnings must be giyen to all individuals prior to custodial inter-
rogation, whether the offense investigated be a felony or a misdemeanor traffic offense. 
716 F.2d at 363. (emphasis by the court) (citation omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). 
28. Id. at 364-65 (Wellford, J., dissenting). 
29. Id. The true difference between the McCarty majority and the dissent appears to be on 
the scope of "custody." Miranda only applies when there is custodial interrogation. Interroga-
tion without custody is not subject to the Miranda requirements. See infra notes 101-113 and 
accompanying text. Presumably, had the dissenter found that McCarty was in custody when 
he made his roadside admissions, the decision would have been unanimous. 
30. It is conceivable that a reviewing court might find that McCarty was not in custody at 
the time of his initial incriminating statements, and hold that the Miranda warnings were thus 
not yet necessary. If so, the court might never reach the general legal issue of the applicability 
of the Miranda warnings to non-felony offenses, and might hold instead that any use of the 
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herently compelling pressures." 31 The factor the Court deemed impor-
tant in creating these inherently coercive pressures was the relationship 
between interrogation and police custody and the effect that the resulting 
atmosphere of intimidation has on a suspect's free will. 32 The Court 
considered these pressures to be of such a magnitude that the suspect's 
free will to decide whether or not to cooperate with the police easily 
could be overborne without prophylactic safeguards. 33 Neither inter-
rogation nor police custody alone, however, creates a coercive at-
mosphere of such magnitude as to require the Miranda warnings. 
Rather, it is the interplay between police interrogation and police custody 
which reinforces the pressures exerted by each element singly, until 
the will of the suspect is subjugated to the will of the examiner. 34 Thus, 
in order to show the requisite inherently coercive atmosphere needed 
to prove a violation of Miranda, two essential elements must be 
established: 35 custody and interrogation. 36 This rationale continues in-
tact to the present day. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that the exact form of the prophylactic Miranda warnings is not dic-
tated by the Constitution,37 the Court held that its basic formulation 
suspect's later, custodial confession is harmless error, if it is error at all. See generally infra 
notes 101-114 and accompanying text. 
31. The court explained that "[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into police 
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion [as 
described in popular police interrogation manuals] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion 
to speak." 384 U.S. at 461. 
32. "In the cases before us today ... we concern ourselves primarily with [the incommunicado 
police-dominated] interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring . . . . It is obvious that 
such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the in-
dividual to the will of his examiner." Id. at 456-57. 
33. The Court emphasized that 
[i]t is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other 
than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries 
its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it 
is equally destructive of human dignity. [It] is at odds with one of our Nation's most 
cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. 
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in 
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the 
product of his free choice. 
Id. at 457-58 (footnote omitted). 
34. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When 
Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. I, 63-65 (1978). 
35. In defining the situations covered by Miranda, the Court stated that "we mean question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). 
For further discussions of the privilege and Miranda, see generally Y. KAMlsAR, W. LAFAVE 
& J. lsRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 553-72 (5th ed. 1980); 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT (1973). 
36. For a detailed discussion of the definition of "custody" and the effect the current stan-
dard would have on the necessity of Miranda warnings in investigations of many minor crimes, 
see infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text. The current definition of "interrogation" is dis-
cussed infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
37. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (noting that Miranda procedural 
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of the warnings is to be mandatory to protect the underlying fifth amend-
ment rights in all criminal cases unless Congress or the states develop 
alternative procedures that would be at least as effective in protecting 
the suspects' right against self-incrimination as the warnings. 38 To this 
end, the court has generally required at least a substantial approxima-
tion of the warnings when the existence of custody and interrogation 
trigger Miranda. 39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has continued to 
subscribe to the two-prong custody/interrogation test for determining 
the applicability of Miranda. Indeed, many of the most important fifth 
amendment decisions of the Court in the last fifteen years, continuing 
through the last term, deal with the threshhold questions of when 
custody and interrogation exist within the Miranda context. 40 
safeguards are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, but are instead measures 
to insure that the fifth amendment rights are not violated). 
38. The Court recognized that: 
[W)e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular 
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently 
conducted . . . . However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least 
as effective in apprising accused persons of their right to silence and in assuring a 
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the [safeguards set forth in this opinion] must 
be observed. 
384 U.S. at 467. 
39. Cf California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (finding suspect fully informed of his 
rights, but finding the issue of the availability of appointed counsel before further interrogation 
not clearly communicated. Held not to be grounds for reversal); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433 (1974) (finding that although suspect was warned of his rights to silence and counsel, he 
was not informed of his right to appointed counsel if indigent. Held not to be grounds for rever-
sal since record clearly showed that statements were not involuntary). 
40. Supreme Court decisions focusing on whether "custody" existed at the time of interroga-
tion have included California v. Beheler, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983) (noting that the ultimate 
inquiry regarding custody for Miranda purposes is simply whether there is formal arrest or the 
functional equivalent of formal arrest); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (finding that 
voluntary appearance of suspect at police station for questioning, after which he was released, 
was not custody); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that suspect was not 
in custody for Miranda purposes during Internal Revenue Service interview in a private home); 
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (I 969) (finding that person questioned by four police officers 
in his boarding house bedroom at 4:00 a.m. was in "custody"); and Mathis v. United States, 
391 U.S. I (1968) (holding that defendant incarcerated for reasons unrelated to purposes of ins-
tant investigation was in Miranda custody when questioned by IRS agents in his prison cell). 
Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (finding that suspect "picked up" for question-
ing and transported to station house was "seized" for fourth amendment purposes, i.e., func-
tional equivalent of arrest). 
The leading case focusing on interrogation as related to Miranda is Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980) (finding Miranda safeguards necessary whenever a person in custody 
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent). The extent of this definition 
of interrogation can be seen by contrasting it with violations of the sixth amendment right to 
counsel, such as that which occurred in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), in which 
a jailed informant reported incriminating conversations with a bank robbery defendant. See White, 
Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. 
L. REV. 1209 (1980): 
[T)he best reading of the Innis test is that it turns upon the objective purpose manifested 
by the police. Thus, an officer 'should know' that his speech or conduct will be 
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B. The Fifth Amendment Historically Applies Regardless of the 
Degree of the Offense or the Severity of the Punishment 
Historical analogy also provides a basis for justifying application 
of the prohibition of coerced confessions (and the resulting require-
ment of pre-interrogation warnings) to non-felony offenses. The com-
mon law privilege against self-incrimination, embodied in the fifth 
amendment, developed separately from the supression of coerced con-
fessions. Because the confessions doctrine has also become part of the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, however, both pro-
visions should follow the same distinctions regarding severity of offense. 
1. The doctrine against involuntary confessions as part of the fifth 
amendment- Although the first regular supression of coerced pretrial 
confessions in England occurred in the latter half of the l 700's, 41 this 
practice developed separately from the privilege against 
self-incrimination. 42 There was some recognition of a nexus between 
the two doctrines, 43 but, in America, they were originally considered 
separate entities with only the self-incrimination prohibition included 
within the scope of the fifth amendment. 44 
In 1897, the Supreme Court rejected this notion in Bram v. United 
States. 45 In that case, the Court declared that in criminal trials, 
"whereever [sic] a question arises whether a confession is incompetent 
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the 
Fifth Amendment ... commanding that no person 'shall be compelled 
m any criminal case to be a witness against himself." ' 46 This view, 
'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' when he should realize that the 
speech or conduct will probably be viewed by the suspect as designed to achieve this 
purpose. 
Id. at 1231-32; see also Kamisar, supra note 34, for the proposition that, unlike violations of 
the sixth amendment right to counsel, the fifth amendment Miranda approach requires that the 
suspect know he is dealing with a police officer in order to show a sufficient level of coercion 
to give rise to the "interrogation" prong of Miranda. 
41. "[l]n 1783, in Warickshall's Case ... the modern rule received a full and clear expres-
sion, and confessions not entitled to credit because of the promises or threats by which they 
had been obtained were declared inadmissible in evidence." 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 820, 
at 297 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970); cf. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, 325-29 
(1968). (tracing the gradual emergence of the supression of coerced confessions from the aboli-
tion of tortue in the mid-I600's through the establishment a century later of an evidentiary 
rule holding coerced confessions inadmissible). 
42. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823, at 338-39 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970); 8 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 2266, at 400-02 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
43. See L. LEVY, supra note 41, at 328-29; Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and 
Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU, & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL 
JusncE IN OUR TIME 27-28 (A. Howard ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, Equal Justice] 
(pointing out that the original meaning of the maxim "no man shall be compelled to accuse 
himself" was that "no man shall make the first charge against himself"). 
44. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 328-29 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
45. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
46. Id. at 542. 
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however, was widely criticized throughout the first two-thirds of the 
20th century, 41 and it was not entirely certain that all courts actually 
accepted it. 48 
In Miranda49 the Supreme Court dispelled any confusion about this 
issue by explicitly extending the fifth amendment privilege to police 
interrogations. The court stated that "[t]oday ... there can be no 
doubt that the fifth amendment privilege is available outside of criminal 
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which 
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being 
compelled to incriminate themselves. " 50 
2. Application of the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege 
without regard to offense- Historically, courts applied the privilege 
against self-incrimination to the judicial compulsion of incriminating 
testimony without distinction as to the severity of the crime. 51 In fact, 
some of the earliest examples of the English use of the privilege occur-
red in prosecutions for relatively minor offenses. 52 The language of 
the fifth amendment itself suggests that the framers recognized that 
the privilege would apply regardless of the degree of the offense. 53 As 
a result of the merger of the self-incrimination and coerced confession 
doctrines in the fifth amendment, 54 the latter should take on the same 
broad application as the self-incrimination privilege. The McCarty deci-
sion relied on this merger in noting that, because the language of the 
47. See, e.g., 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 2252, at 328-29 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Morgan, 
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. I, 29 (1949). But see Kamisar, Equal 
Justice, supra note 43, at 20-38 (supporting the application of the privilege to the police interrogation 
room, or, as Professor Kamisar refers to it, the "gatehouse" of the criminal justice system). 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951); Upshaw v. United States, 
335 U.S. 410, 414 n.2 (1948); Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1955); Wood 
v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
Note that apparently even the petitioners in Miranda were unsure whether to proceed on fifth 
amendment grounds, or to confine themselves to more "conventional" sixth amendment 
grounds. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 35, at 578 (remarks of John 
Flynn, defense counsel in Miranda). 
49. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
50. Id. at 467. But see id. at 526-27 (White, J., dissenting). 
51. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 289 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (stating that 
in the 1600's, it began to be flatly claimed "that nc, man is bound to incriminate himself on 
any charge ... or in any court."). See generally L. LEVY, supra note 41, at 301-32 (1968). 
52. For example, in 1638, the case of John Lilburne, who refused to make incriminating 
sworn statements in a prosecution in the Star Chamber for the relatively minor (see infra note 
57 and accompanying text) crimes of religious non-conformity and seditious libel, led to a bill 
in the House of Lords declaring that "none of the King's subjects hereafter [shall! be put to 
accuse themselves by or upon their own oaths in any criminal case whatsoever ... " L. LEVY, 
supra note 41, at 281 (1968). See generally id. at 271-84; see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 
42 § 2250, at 289 (McNaughton re~. ed. 1961). 
53. See supra note I. It may be unwise, however, to place too much reliance on the literal 
wording of the amendment. See discussion of the limitations of the sixth amendment rights to 
jury trial and counsel, infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
54. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50. 
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fifth amendment has never been construed to limit the privilege to those 
charged with felonies, it would be illogical to suggest that a defendant 
charged with a misdemeanor could be compelled to testify against 
himself. 55 Merger of the confession and self-incrimination. doctrines 
into the fifth amendment should therefore compel the same conclu-
sion with regard to misdemeanors and coerced pre-trial confessions. 
C. The Application of Sixth Amendment Guarantees Supports 
Extention of Miranda Warnings to Non-Felony Investigations 
Utilizing Custodial Interrogation 
Several courts and commentators have analogized to the sixth amend-
ment's distinction between serious and minor crimes to determine 
whether prophylactic warnings are required for non-felony custodial 
interrogation. 56 
1. Areas in which different treatment for Felony and Non-felony 
Defendants is Justified- The criminal law has a long tradition of 
distinguishing between crimes of a serious nature and offenses of a 
lesser nature, especially between felonies and misdemeanors. The original 
common law distinction between felonies and misdemeanors was quite 
pronounced, because felonies were generally punishable by death and 
forfeiture of property while misdemeanors were not. 57 Today, of course, 
this harsh demarcation between felonies and misdemeanors has col-
lapsed, although the severity of prescribed punishment is still widely 
used as the standard to determine whether a crime is a felony or some 
lesser offense. Both the Model Penal Code and Title 18 of the United 
States Code define felonies as crimes punishable by one year or more 
of imprisonment and further divide the class of lesser crimes into misde-
meanors and petty misdemeanors. 58 The authorized sentence for a crime, 
55. McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361,363 (6th Cir. 1983), cert granted sub nom. Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984) (No. 83-710). 
56. See, e.g., McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1983), cert granted sub nom. 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984) (No. 83-710); Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. 
Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969); Note, Potentiality of Incarceration: A Proposed Standard for 
the Applicability of Miranda to Nonfelony Offenses, 52 IND. L.J. 449, 460-62 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Potentiality of Incarceration); Note, Does Miranda Apply to Traffic Arrests?, 
27 WAYNE L. REv. 193, 195-97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Traffic Arrests); Comment, 
Miranda and Minor Offenses, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 766, 771-74 (1972); cf. State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio 
St. 2d 64, 68-69, 249 N.E.2d 826, 828-29 (1969) (Taft, J., concurring), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
1007 (1970). 
57. See J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 487-92 (1883). This 
distinction existed until relatively recently; from the eighteenth century until as late as the early 
nineteenth century, English law recognized as many as fifty-four capital offenses, although in 
practice the death penalty was rarely carried out for many of these crimes, since many of those 
sentenced to death were pardoned conditionally upon their being transported to either the American 
or later the Australian colonies for life or a long term of years. Id. at 471-72. 
58. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 1.04 (1980). The section reads in part: 
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including whether it is classified as a felony, misdemeanor, or petty 
misdemeanor, continues to have some independent relevance in cer-
tain legislatively defined policy areas. 59 Analogous Constitutional distinc-
tions, however, are more useful in evaluating whether informing suspects 
of their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be 
so conditioned. 
2. Is the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination more 
like the sixth amendment right to jury trial or the right to counsel?-
The sixth amendment provides a useful analogy, especially because it 
sets constitutional, as opposed to legislative, standards. The right to 
a jury trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments has been held 
to turn on whether the maximum authorized imprisonment for the crime 
being tried is greater than six months. 60 The Supreme Court, has held, 
however, that the sixth amendment right to counsel at trial attaches 
whenever the defendant is to be sentenced to any actual custodial 
sentence, regardless of the length of the sentence or the type of crime. 61 
In addition to noting the strong historical support for the right to 
trial by jury being conditioned on the maximum allowable sentence, 62 
the Supreme Court has engaged in a balancing of the high costs im-
posed by requiring jury trials for petty offenses versus the marginal 
gains in justice that might hypothetically occur. Essentially, the Court 
has expressed its belief that a fair trial may be obtained without a jury. 63 
(2) A crime is a felony if it is so designated in the code or if persons convicted thereof 
may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which . . . is in excess of one year. 
(3) A crime is a misdemeanor if it is so designated in the code or if persons con-
victed thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which ... is in excess 
of thirty days but not more than one year. 
(4) A crime is a petty misdemeanor if it is so designated in this code or if persons 
convicted thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term which ... does not 
exceed thirty days. 
Title 18 of the United States Code, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, reads in part: 
(I) Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 
is a felony. 
(2) Any other offense is a misdemeanor. 
(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprsonment for a 
period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense. 
18 U.S.C. § I (1982). 
59. For example, many jurisdictions use the type of crime or the length of the sentence to 
determine whether post-conviction incarceration will be to a penitentiary or to a local jail or 
workhouse. The federal evidence rules, FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(l), and the evidence rules of various 
states allow impeachment of witnesses for prior convictions only if the conviction was for a 
crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. 
60. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
61. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
62. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). The Court noted that, with few excep-
tions, crimes traditionally triable without a jury in the United States were generally punishable 
by no more than a six-month prison term. 
63. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (dictum). 
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Although not always explicitly acknowledging the analogy, some courts 
holding Miranda inapplicable to certain non-felony offenses have 
employed a similar balancing test. 64 
The Supreme Court's break with the jury trial distinction in sixth 
amendment right to counsel cases weakens the external validity of this 
approach. 65 The purpose of the Miranda protections more closely 
resembles the sixth amendment right to counsel, which applies to all 
offenses punished by actual imprisonment, rather than the right to a 
jury trial, which does not apply to crimes punishable by less than six 
months imprisonment. In 1972, the Court noted that the historical sup-
port that existed for a "severity of punishment" standard for the right 
to trial by jury did not exist regarding the assistance of counsel at trial 
and that, unlike the presence of a jury, the presence of counsel "is 
often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial. " 66 Like the sixth 
amendment right to counsel, the fifth amendment rights are also 
ultimately premised on the fairness of the judicial process. 67 Thus, the 
sixth amendment right to counsel, which rejects a balancing test at 
least insofar as there is any jail sentence upon conviction, is more closely 
analogous to the Miranda protections than is the right to trial by jury. 
Indeed, one of the theoretical underpinnings of the McCarty holding 
requiring Miranda protections is an explicit analogy to the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. 68 
64. See State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. I, 16, 268 A.2d I, 9 (1970); State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 
2d 64, 68-69, 249 N.E.2d 826, 828-29 (1969) (Taft, J., concurring), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 
(1970); see also Comment, Miranda and Minor Offenses, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 766, 772-73 (1972). 
The costs of requiring Miranda protection may not be nearly so high as some courts have 
assumed. See infra notes 115-125 and accompanying text. 
65. In the early years after Miranda, the sixth amendment right to trial by jury was more 
clearly deliniated in misdemeanor cases than was the sixth amendment right to counsel. In Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court indicated that the right to jury trial was inap-
plicable to offenses punishable by less than six-months imprisonment. Thus, state courts were 
aware that the Supreme Court did not apply at least this constitutional right to petty offenses, 
and thus could reason that other rights (such as the Miranda prophylactic protections of the 
privilege against self-incrimination) may similarily be inapplicable to petty offenses. 
66. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); cf. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) 
(holding that counsel was required in every case in which the defendant was given a sentence 
that deprived him of liberty). 
67. The Miranda court stated "[w]ithout the protections flowing from adequate warning and 
the rights of counsel, 'all the careful safeguards around the giving of testimony ... would become 
empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confes-
sion, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."' 384 U.S. 
at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); cf. Kamisar, 
Equal Justice, supra note 43. But cf. u·nited States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 
1980) (implying that the sixth amendment right to counsel standard may be more stringent than 
the fifth amendment right to counsel standard). Compare Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 
(1977) (finding a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel) with Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291 (1980) (finding no violation of the fifth amendment right to counsel). 
68. McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984) (No. 83-710). 
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3. Limitations on the sixth amendment right to counsel analogy 
in determining the applicability of the Miranda warnings- Use of the 
sixth amendment right to counsel analogy, however, does not com-
pletely resolve the issue of Miranda's applicability to non-felony 
offenses. The Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment re-
quires that any defendant actually sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment be entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial. 69 These decisions, 
however, imply that an indigent misdemeanor defendant is not enti-
tled to appointed counsel unless a jail sentence is to be imposed upon 
conviction. 10 Therefore, a rigid application of an analogy to this sixth 
amendment right would require that a distinction be made between 
interrogation during the investigation of offenses for which incarcera-
tion is ultimately imposed upon conviction, and interrogation for in-
fractions for which incarceration is ultimately not imposed. 11 Such a 
distinction would not only dilute and impose additional requirements 
on the Miranda focus on custodial interrogation, but it also would 
be virtually impossible to apply as a practical matter. 12• 
For example, one troublesome aspect of the sixth amendment right 
to counsel standard which might be carried over into the Miranda area 
1s the sixth amendment's effective requirement that arraigning judges 
who are loathe to appoint counsel for all indigents either conduct a 
preliminary hearing regarding the probability of incarceration upon con-
viction, or refuse to appoint counsel and waive the right of the sentenc-
ing judge to incarcerate the defendant. 73 This result has been criticized 
for removing flexibility in sentencing discretion and for tampering 
with legislative determinations of appropriate sentences. 74 Were an 
analogous standard adopted, which allowed the interrogating officer 
69. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
70. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
71. Such a holding by the United States Supreme Court would, of course, mean that the 
defendant in the case currently before the Court would succeed in having his conviction over-
turned for lack of Miranda warnings, since he served a jail term. Yet an identical defendant 
who ultimately did not receive a sentence including imprisonment would not be entitled to Miranda 
protection. 
72. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 126-132 and accom-
panying text. 
73. See generally Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 35, at 70-72. 
74. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 82 (1979): 
It seems ... likely that, due to the sheer volume of misdemeanor cases, judges simply 
will not appoint counsel, thereby relinquishing their discretion to impose the penalty 
of imprisonment. However, because it eliminates a penalty authorized by statute, this 
practice is unacceptable; in effect, the judiciary would be interfering with the legislature's 
judgment concerning the appropriate range of penalties. 
Id. at 87 (citations omitted); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 382 (1979) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that problems inherent in the application of the actual imprisonment standard 
"demonstrate the superiority of an 'authorized imprisonment' standard.that would require the 
appointment of counsel for ... any offense for which imprisonment for any time is authorized"). 
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to decide not to administer the Miranda warnings prior to interroga-
tion based on his opinion as to the suspect's "potentiality of incarcera-
tion" upon an eventual conviction, the weaknesses of the sixth amend-
ment standard would be exacerbated. In many cases the officer, who 
may not be trained to analyze sentencing provisions, would be making 
a determination before formal charges have even crystallized. If the 
interrogator decided not to give the warnings, the Miranda exclusionary 
rule would presumably require either that any incriminating admissions 
be suppressed at trial, or (in an analogy to the sixth amendment right 
to counsel) that the judge admit the statements and waive the ability 
to sentence the defendant to any actual imprisonment. 75 Therefore, 
adoption of a non-felony Miranda standard closely modeled on the 
sixth amendment right to counsel standard would be unsatisfactory. 
4. The sixth amendment's limitation on "all criminal prosecutions" 
to exclude petty offenses is inconsistant with the Miranda rationale-
The most expedient constitutional justification for limiting Miranda's 
applicability would be to alter the fifth amendment's definition of "any 
75. Likewise, such a standard would not solve some of the problems that currently exist 
in decisions such as that in Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976). See infra notes 128-132 
and accompanying text. For example, the charges that the interrogating officer may be con-
templating might grow considerably more serious after interrogation, as in State v. Lewin, 163 
N.J. Super 439, 395 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1978) (defendant arrested for driving while intoxicated 
following accident; statements made during custodial interrogation without prior Miranda warn-
ings later used in death by auto prosecution after death of passenger) certification denied, 81 
N .J. 58, 404 A.2d 1157, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 905 (1979). In such instances, the dilemma facing 
the judge could be unacceptable - either suppress the incriminating statements and jeopardize 
the conviction, or admit the statements and be unable to impose appropriate punishment. Further-
more, in jurisdictions in which multiple offenders are subject to charges of greater degree or 
enhanced sentences, the interrogating officer would have to delay questioning until these im-
plications of the charge had been determined. Cf. infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text: 
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that prior misdemeanor conviction obtained 
without benefit of sixth amendment assigned counsel could not be used to elevate subsequent 
conviction to a felony). 
At least one commentator has argued that a "potentiality of incarceration" standard be employed 
in determining the necessity of the fifth amendment Miranda warnings. See Note, Potentiality 
of Incarceration, supra note 56. This proposed standard would require the warnings whenever 
incarceration is statutorily authorized for the offense for which the suspect is being interrogated. 
This standard would not solve the very real problem of the possible charges not having crystallized 
at the time of the interrogation, thus requiring that either the statements be supressed or im-
prisonment not to be imposed if more serious charges are later filed. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court rejected this type of "authorized sentence" formulation for the sixth amendment right 
to counsel in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
Another solution to this problem is suggested by the REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE 
TRIAL OF MISDEMEANORS BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES rule 2(b) (Preliminary Draft 1979) 
(requiring the magistrate to give what are essentially the Miranda warnings to petty offense defen-
dants at the initial appearance before the court, unless the defendant is charged with a crime 
not covered by Scott and Argersinger (i.e., no imprisonment will be imposed if the defendant 
is convicted)). A similar modification to the Miranda warnings could take place during the inter-
rogation phase, but would also be subject to challenge for the reasons applicable to the previously 
mentioned conditional solution. 
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criminal case" 16 to not include certain petty offenses. The Supreme 
Court limited the sixth amendment definition of "all criminal prosecu-
tions" in this way to validate not extending the right to a jury trial 
to petty offenses. 77 The New Jersey courts took this approach to limit 
Miranda. New Jersey has expressly altered its definition of "crime" 
by declaring that petty offenses are merely "quasi-criminal" and thus 
not subject to the same Miranda standards as ,"criminal" offenses. 78 
Such definitional manipulations avoid the history of the fifth amend-
ment and the acceptance that the fifth amendment privilege applies 
at trial for even the most minor offenses. 79 Furthermore, the rationale 
for Miranda, the existence of "inherent compulsion" in the custodial 
interrogation process, 80 does not lose its validity simply because the 
offense for which the interrogation is conducted does not rise to a 
certain level of seriousness. To do so would be effectively to impose 
a third prong on the ''interplay of custody and interrogation'' 
standard. 81 
Even one noted authority who is favorably disposed toward the 
Miranda doctrine, however, has stated that the warnings might not 
be applicable unless the offense for which the interrogation is con-
ducted contains a sufficient degree of "stigma" to be considered a 
"crime" by the community. 82 This argument is essentially grounded 
on the assumption that the coercion inherent in custodial interroga-
tion may be held not to reach a sufficiently high level without some 
realization by the suspect of the seriousness of the matter. 83 
This formulation finds no support in the Miranda decision or in 
76. U.S. CoNsT. amend V. 
77. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
78. See State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380,226 A.2d 16 (App. Div.), aff'd, 50 N.J. 361, 
235 A.2d 193 (1967); cf State v. Maier, 13 N.J. 235,278, 99 A.2d 21, 47 (1953) (holding that 
"a summary proceeding before a municipal magistrate is not a criminal prosectution."). 
79. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. New Jersey, however, does not make the "quasi-
criminal" distinction in determining the availability of the in-court privilege for petty offense 
defendants. See N .J. CT. R. 3:4-2. (requiring that defendant must be warned of privilege against 
self-incrimination at first appearance before the Court); cf. State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 
69-70, 249 N.E.2d 826, 829 (1969) (Duncan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Miranda applies to 
misdemeanor offenses because the fifth amendment privilege applies to testimony in misdemeanor 
trials), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). 
80. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. 
81. Admittedly, in order to fulfill the "inherently coercive" standard, the suspect must at 
least realize he is dealing with law enforcement officials. See Kamisar, supra note 34 (arguing 
that with undercover agents, there is no interplay between custody and interrogation in the suspect's 
mind, because he does not feel compelled to speak by color of official authority). 
82. A NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: Escobedo - THE SECOND ROUND, 108-09 (B. George 
ed. 1967) (comments of Professor Kamisar during panel discussion). 
83. See Kamisar, supra note 34, which states: 
When a suspect is arrested and brought downtown for police questioning, at least in 
the case of a major felony, he will often be in "a crisis laden situation. The stakes 
are high - often his freedom for a few or many years - and his prospects hinge 
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following cases. 84 In addition, the "stigma" proposition is probably 
untrue as a matter of human nature. Although a "hardened criminal" 
might find the "inherent coercion" lessened to some extent when he 
is interrogated for burning leaves on Sunday without a permit, 85 a 
heretofore law-abiding senior citizen placed in custody for the same 
infraction might well consider this a major calamity. 86 The Miranda 
opinion itself peripherally addressed this concern by noting that the 
warnings would be required for all suspects subjected to custodial in-
terrogation, regardless of their background. 87 In short, imposing any 
type of additional severity requirement is inconsistent with the fun-
damental rationales of the privilege. 88 
III. APPLYING THE Miranda PROTECTIONS TO ALL CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATIONS IS A WORKABLE STANDARD 
Although there are compelling theoretical justifications for applying 
Miranda identically for all types of infractions, regardless of their 
seriousness or potential sentences, some courts have focused on various 
"practical" objections to such a requirement. One objection to the 
custodial interrogation formulation is that the type of questioning in-
volved in minor offenses does not reach the level of "interrogation" 
on decisions that must be quickly made: to cooperate ancl hope for leniency, to try 
and talk his way out, to stand adamantly on his rights." 
Id. at 196-97. (quoting Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE 
L.J. 1519, 1613-14 (1967)) (emphasis added). 
84. In fact, a recent Supreme Court case involving a drunk driving arrest appears to assume 
tacitly the applicability of the warnings to custodial interrogation, but finds that blood alcohol 
tests are not "testimonial," and thus do not meet the interrogation requirement of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. o: 916 (1983). See Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking of blood sample, etc. does not violate privilege against 
self-incrimination because the event is non-testimonial in nature); see also Arenella, Schmerber 
and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 38-40 
(1982) (discussing fifth amendment distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence). 
85. Professor Kamisar used the burning leaves hypothetical to illustrate his point about 
"stigmaless" offenses. A NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: Escobedo - THE SECOND ROUND, supra 
note 82, at 109. 
86. Cf. R. MEDCALIE, FROM Escobedo TO Miranda: THE ANATOMY OF A SUPREME COURT DECI-
SION 60 (1966) (exerpt from amicus brief of the National District Attorney's Association) (claim-
ing that the beneficiaries of warnings "are the professional and the recidivist" rather than the 
innocent); lnbau, Police Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & 
POLICE Sci. 16, 19-20 (1961) (arguing that the police must deal with criminals on a lower moral 
plane than would be necessary with law-abiding citizens). 
87. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468-69 (requiring warnings regardless of background 
of individual, including "prior contact with the authorities"). 
88. Finally, even if one accepts this "lack of stigma" argument, the case to which the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari would clearly be found to have such "stigma" as to constitute a crime. 
The defendant was convicted and sentenced to jail for operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor under OHio REV. CooE ANN. 
§ 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1982). Furthermore, drunk driving clearly has been receiving increased 
nationwide attention and condemnation recently. 
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for Miranda purposes. 89 Another set of objections has been based 
on the premise that the justice system would be overburdened, if not 
crippled, by a floo_d of petty and traffic offense suspects invoking their 
Miranda rights, especially indigents invoking the right to appointed 
counsel. 90 The Miranda custody standard as it is currently articulated, 
however, should eliminate much of this burden. 91 Furthermore, even 
those cases falling within the custodial interrogation standard do not 
significantly increase the hardship on law enforcement. 92 
A. The Custodial Interrogation Standard of Miranda in Practice 
The general trigger for the Miranda requirements is the existence 
of custodial interrogation. 93 The Supreme Court's definitions of "in-
terrogation" and "custody" are both equally applicable to non-felony 
offenses and felonies. In addition, the current custody standard will 
itself reduce much of the potential overburdening that has concerned 
some courts. Therefore, an examination of the two prongs of the stan-
dard is warranted. 
I. Interrogation- Interrogation has been held to include not only 
express questioning but also "any words or actions on the part of the 
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that 
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect. " 94 This broad definition of interrogation 
89. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra note 16; see also State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972). The court declared 
that it was 
not reasonable or practical rule that a trooper or other traffic officer investigating 
. . . vehicular offenses, must give the Miranda warnings and possibly wait for the 
driver to obtain an attorney, or for one to be appointed for him .... There are 
probably not enough attorneys available to provide pre-interrogation counsel for all 
of the persons desiring such that are involved in the thousands of vehicular offenses 
that occur every year in this state. 
Id. at 553; accord State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1971) (applying Miranda 
to simple misdemeanors "would unduly interfere with proper law enforcement in that area and 
preclude the police from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions"), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 912 (1972). 
Some courts have further justified taking this approach by refering to the "traditional func-
tion of police officers in investigating crime" exception mentioned in Miranda. 384 U.S. at 477. 
See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1976). For further discussion of the "in-
vestigatory exception" to Miranda, see infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. 
91. See infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text. 
92. See infra notes 115-125 and accompanying text. 
93. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977) (reaffirming that nothing less than actual 
custodial interrogation would trigger Miranda); see also supra note 40. 
94. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,301 (1980). One may question, however, the majori-
ty's application of this rule to the case's facts. Id. at 306-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (wondering 
how the majority could conclude that the officer's "offhand remarks" could not have been 
reasonably expected to elicit a response). Professor White argues that "the best reading of the 
Innis test" determines if a comment constitutes interrogation by asking whether "an objective 
observer (with the same k_!l_owledge of the suspect as the officer) would," solely on the basis 
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does not depend on the length or intensity of the questioning. 95 
At least one court, however, sought to distinguish questioning for 
minor crimes from the type of questioning at which Miranda was 
directed, because police questions relating to minor offenses are not 
"lengthy, incommunicado inquisition[s] seeking to 'sweat out' a 
confession.' ' 96 The same court, however, admitted that the fruits of 
questioning for minor violations may nevertheless be incriminating. 97 
Under the Supreme Court's definition of "interrogation," this distinc-
tion would clearly be erroneous. 98 Although questioning for non-felony 
crimes in some cases may not be as extensive as for felonies, 99 ques-
tioning for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements nevertheless 
falls clearly within the Miranda definition of interrogation, regardless 
of its degree of ''intensity.'' 100 
2. Custody- There are important limitations built into the Miranda 
definition of custody. On its face, the Miranda definition of "custody" 
is not entirely clear. 101 If custody occurred each time that a police of-
ficer had the "articulable and reasonable suspicion" necessary to stop 
an automobile 102 or made an investigatory stop of a suspicious person 
on the street, 103 there might be grounds for concern that the role of 
police in investigating routine incidents might be somewhat hampered. 10• 
of the officer's remarks, infer that these remarks were "designed to elicit an incriminating 
response." White, supra note 40, at 1231, 1233. Under this analysis, if the police do not intend 
to interrogate a suspect in custody, they presumably would not need to give Miranda warnings. 
95. The Innis court broadly defined "incriminating response" to include any statement that 
the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial. 446 U.S. at 301 n.5. 
This definition would include many questions routinely asked in the course of investigations 
for minor crimes, such as, "where did you get this necklace?" (shoplifting); "Do you know 
how fast you were going?" (speeding); or "how many drinks have you had this evening?" (drunk 
driving). See also infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text (obtaining drunk driving convic-
tions may depend on these types of questions). 
96. State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. I, 16, 268 A.2d I, 9 (1970). 
97. The New Jersey court stated that questioning in motor vehicle violations normally "en-
compasses only simple standard inquiries ... even though some of the information obtained 
may go beyond the so-called investigatory phase and be inculpatory as to the violation .... " Id. 
98. See supra note 94. 
99. But see People v. McLaren, 55 Misc. 2d 676,677,285 N.Y.S.2d 991, 992 (Nassau Coun-
ty Dist. Ct. I 967) (involving a police custodial "interview" for drunk driving that consisted of 
44 questions and answers). Cases like this reduce the persuasiveness of the blanket position adopted 
by some courts, like the Macuk court, that interrogation for minor offenses never rises to the 
necessary level of coerciveness to require Miranda. 
100. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
IOI. Miranda holds that procedural safeguards must be employed when "an individual is taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom ... in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 
478 (emphasis added). 
102. Police need at least an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" to stop and detain a motorist 
for license and registration checks. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
103. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). 
104. Shortly after the Miranda decision Professor Kamisar stated that he believed that Miranda 
clearly covered the "stop-on-the-street-and-question" situation. A NEw LooK AT CONFESSIONS: 
Escobedo - THE SECOND ROUND, supra note 82, at 98. This view would impose substantial 
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The Miranda decision itself, however, qualified the scope of custody 
by noting that the holding "is not intended to hamper the traditional 
function of police officers in investigating crime .... General on-the-
scene questioning as to the facts surrounding a crime ... is not af-
fected by our holding." 105 
In subsequent cases the Court has clarified the investigatory excep-
tion to Miranda. 106 Today, the general custody standard which trig-
gers Miranda is defined as formal arrest or a restraint on freedom 
equivalent to formal arrest. 101 Thus, the definition of "custody" for 
Miranda purposes does not include even relatively lengthy investigatory 
stops and automobile stops to write citations, 108 even if the jurisdic-
tion gives the police officer the discretion to arrest or, alternatively, 
to issue citations. 109 Unless the suspect has actually been taken into 
custody before he makes incriminating statements, the Miranda custody 
standard is not met. 1 1 0 
The definition of "custody" for Miranda purposes, therefore, 
effectively exempts questioning in the majority of traffic offenses (with 
the possible exception of drunk driving)' 11 and many misdemeanors 
burdens on law enforcement: in a city the size of Chicago, there may be over 250,000 police-
suspect encounters of this type annually. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 35, 
at 14. A general uncertainty regarding the scope of the custody requirement may have caused 
some courts to refuse to apply Miranda for fear of overburdening the law enforcement system. 
105. 384 U.S. at 477. 
106. See California v. Beheler, 103 S. Ct 3517 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 
(1977). 
107. In California v. Beheler, 103 S. Ct. 3517 (1983) (per curiam), the Court stated that 
"the ultimate inquiry [in determining whether a suspect is 'in custody' for the purposes of receiv-
ing Miranda protection) is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. at 3520. (quoting Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). 
108. See Note, Traffic Arrests, supra note 56, at 199- 200. 
109. See Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 35, at 14-15, n.c. 
110. But see MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § I 10 .. 2(5) (1975) (requiring 
Miranda before any sustained questioning of persons stopped by an officer who suspects the 
person may have committed a crime). 
The Supreme Court currently has the opportunity to clarify exactly when custody occurs 
in the aftermath of a traffic infraction. State v. Roberti, 293 Or. 59, 644 P.2d 1104, rev'd on 
rehearing, 293 Or. 236, 646 P.2d 1341 (1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3150 (Aug. 
20, 1982). The Oregon Supreme Court assumed that once an alleged drunk driver is in custody, 
Miranda warnings are required. The only question being appealed to the Supreme Court is whether 
the suspect was in custody for Miranda purposes. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3095 (Aug. 16, 1983). 
Even the dissenting judge in McCarty, the recent Sixth Circuit decision which is now before 
the United States Supreme Court, acknowledges that, had custody been established, the police 
would have been required to give the Miranda warnings prior to interrogation. The dissenting 
judge, however, believed that the incriminating remarks were elicited prior to the establishment 
of custody, and that post-custody statements were therefore irrelevant. McCarty v. Herdman, 
716 F.2d 361, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1983) (Wellford, J. dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984) (No. 83-710). See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
11 I. See infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text. 
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from the warnings requirement, because law enforcement officers 
routinely issue citations to suspects and release them after investiga-
tions of traffic or petty violations. 112 Furthermore, even if the officer 
eventually arrests the suspect for a minor offense, most of the ques-
tioning takes place at the scene, before Miranda custody is established. 113 
Only in those comparatively uncommon instances in which an officer 
arrests the non-felony suspect and engages in post-arrest interrogation 
does the interplay between custody and interrogation which triggers 
Miranda occur. 114 Nevertheless, in those non-felony cases in which 
custodial interrogation does take place, the Miranda rationale applies 
to the same extent as when custodial interrogation occurs for more 
serious offenses. 
B. The Burden of Giving Miranda Warnings is Insignificant 
Although the custodial interrogation requirement largely destroys the 
validity of the overburdening arguments against· Miranda, even when 
the warnings are given, suspects subjected to custodial interrogation 
will not invoke their rights in all cases. Several studies have concluded 
that even in felony arrests, which would, because the stakes are much 
higher than misdemeanors, presumably have a higher Miranda invoca-
tion rate, 115 very few defendants actually invoke their Miranda rights. 116 
Based on this evidence, police would not be overwhelmed with requests 
I 12. See generally A. KALMANOFF, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
189-91 (1976); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 170-72 
(1965). Cf. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMNET PROCEDURE § 120.2 (1975); UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 
22l(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1974). 
I 13. One commentator who supports Miranda warnings for various minor offenses even sug-
gests that police deliberately delay the onset of custody in minor cases until questioning is com-
plete in order to circumvent the Miranda custody requirement. Note, Traffic Arrests, supra note 
56, at 212-13. 
114. The availability of non-custodial, and thus non-Miranda, questioning also helps alleviate 
potential problems in meeting the necessary "knowing and intelligent" Miranda rights waiver 
standard. 384 U.S. at 444, 475 (derived from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). Sometimes 
persons arrested for lesser offenses are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The waiver stan-
dard is not met if the defendant can prove a sufficient degree of intoxication at the time of 
custodial interrogation, as in Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969) 
(finding lack of valid waiver in a drunk driving case because of intoxication). Because the waiver 
requirement in non-custodial questioning is the somewhat less strict "voluntariness" test, this 
potential problem does not arise in many non-felony investigations. The police procedure of 
deferring interrogation until alcohol or drug intoxication diminishes to insure a knowing and 
intelligent waiver may be employed for both non-felony and felony suspects. In fact, in many 
felony cases some form of intoxication interfers with questioning. See NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 
Assoc., CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATIONS AFTER Miranda 58-59 (rev. 5th ed. 1975). 
115. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: 
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1352 n.23 ("If all 73,492 nontraf-
fic offenses are considered, the rate of those requesting counsel is only 2%. As might have been 
expected, the rate of call for lawyers ... was higher for persons charged with more serious 
offenses .... "). 
116. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 115, at 1352 & n.23 (reporting that during 
one year, only seven percent of those arrested for felonies and serious misdemeanors requested 
SPRING 1984] Non-Felony Miranda Warnings · 649 
for lawyers or invocations of silence in those misdemeanor cases in 
which they wished to conduct custodial interrogation. Even in those 
relatively rare instances in which def end ants invoked their Miranda 
rights, the authorities would merely have to proceed in the same man-
ner as they do for invocations of the rights in more serious offenses. 11 7 
Finally, the consequences of an invocation of Miranda in minor of-
fenses is often less detrimental to the state's case than in serious crimes. 
This is because the police officer is much more likely to have witnessed 
the minor infraction directly and thus is likely fo be able to establish 
the elements of the offense without the necessity of eliciting incriminating 
admissions by the suspect. 1 1 8 
The specific context of drunk driving violations is, however, an ex-
ample of one area in which the overburdening argument may have more 
force.' 19 Although breath tests and other methods of chemically deter-
mining the blood alcohol content of a suspected drunk driver are not 
subject to Miranda requirements, 120 procuring other necessary infor-
mation may require some interrogation. Information obtained by ques-
tioning the suspect, such as the time of his first and last drinks, is often 
important in proving that the suspect was legally intoxicated at the 
time he was operating the motor vehicle. This testimonial evidence is 
especially important if there has been a delay between the time of the 
police stop and the administration of the test. 121 
If Miranda warnings are required prior to questioning drivers about 
their condition, at least some suspects would probably invoke their 
counsel. The rate dropped to two percent for all offenses); Project, supra note 83, at 1523 (con-
cluding "that there is no evidence indicating that the [Miranda) warnings ... caused many 
suspects to refuse to talk or ask for counsel."); see also 0. STEPHENS, supra note 35, at 165-200 
(compiling several studies). But see F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND, 280-81 (1970) (stating 
that some prosecutors dispute the results of the academic studies). 
117. In this regard, it is of interest to note that the Delaware Supreme Court, although holding 
that Miranda is not required prior to questioning for a drunk driving offense, suggested that 
law enforcement personnel give the Miranda warnings because of the ease of doing so and because 
the fulfillment of Miranda requirements would actually prevent delays in the judicial system 
due to challenges to the admissibility of incriminating statements elicited without benefit of Miranda. 
State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848, 850 (Del. 1968). 
ll8. Cf. State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 67, 249 N.E.2d 826, 827-28 (1969) (taking judicial 
notice that misdemeanors generally take place in the presence of the arresting officer, thus mitigating 
the necessity for concerted interrogation not conducted at or near the scene), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 1007 (1970). 
119. Note that some states, when faced with a drunk driving case, have exempted all vehicular 
offenses from Miranda requirements. See, e.g., State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); State 
v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972). 
120. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 & n.15 (1983); Schmerber v. California, 
384 U .s. 757, 760-65 (1966); see also 3 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES, § 32.03(2) 
(1984). 
121. Blood alcohol content peaks approximately one hour after the injestion of alcohol and 
then decreases at a relatively constant rate. Therefore, the time of the last drink taken is relevant 
to determining the blood alcohol content at the time of operation of the vehicle. See generally 
I R. ERWIN, supra note 120, at § 15.01-.04. 
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rights. Even if suspects answer the police officer's questions, they 
may later challenge the admissibility of the statements by alleging that 
their intoxication prevented them from making a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of their Miranda rights. 122 This problem, however, can be 
minimized by police procedural changes. 123 Police can ask the perti-
nent questions as part of their non-custodial roadside investigation. 124 
In addition, law enforcement officials can minimize the delay between 
apprehension and testing, and thus the need for such questioning, by 
equipping police units to perform chemical sobriety tests in the field. 125 
C. The Consequences of Non-felony Conviction Are Sufficiently 
Serious to Merit Fifth Amendment Procedural Protection 
In a cost-benefit sense, it may be possible to argue that the minor 
consequences accompanying misdemeanor or traffic offense convictions 
do not justify burdening law enforcement officers with the duty to 
issue Miranda warnings to such suspects. This reasoning is implied by 
those courts which justify allowing the fruits of non-Miranda custodial 
interrogations for minor offenses by pointing to the less-than-severe 
consequences that would befall an accused who is convicted by 
self-incrimination. 
First, such an assumption is completely at odds with the basic 
Miranda rationale. The Miranda court addressed this issue when it re-
jected the assertion that society's need for interrogation outweighed 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 126 The Court noted that "[i]n 
announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of the burdens which 
122. See supra note 114. 
123. Such procedural changes in minor crime interrogations have been advocated by another 
commentator. See supra note 113. 
124. For discussion of the custody standard see supra notes 101-114 and accompanying text. 
125. See, e.g., 3 R. ERWIN, supra note 120, at § 32.04(l)(c)(i). 
With the possible exception of the role that blood alcohol content plays in drunk driving cases, 
there is little logical basis to distinguish custodial interrogation for misdemeanors committed 
behind the wheel of an automobile from custodial interrogation for misdemeanors committed 
while walking down the street, except that the need for custodial interrogation for vehicular 
misdemeanors may arise less frequently, because the officer generally observes the infraction 
himself. See supra note I 18. The issues of custody and interrogation, which are the basis for 
Miranda, are identical in both instances. Therefore, although the question to which the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari specifically challenges Miranda's application to misdemeanor traffic 
offenses, see 52 U.S.L.W. 3427 (Nov. 29, 1983) (summary of question presented in Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984)), the Court should address the issue more broadly in relation-
ship to all non-felony offenses. A holding by the Supreme Court that misdemeanor traffic of-
fenses are exempt from the Miranda requirement would be difficult to limit specifically to traffic 
offenses, and could easily be expanded to place all misdemeanors beyond the reach of Miranda. 
126. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court stated: 
[A] recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation 
outweighs the privilege. This argument is not unfamiliar to this Court. The whole thrust 
of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights 
of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided 
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law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying circumstances 
. . . . The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should 
not constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law 
enforcement.'' 121 
There are other, more practical reasons to recognize the imposition 
of this modest burden on law enforcement personnel. Conditioning 
the availability of the Miranda prophylactic safeguards on the seriousness 
of the offense could open a large loophole through which to circum-
vent the Miranda requirements altogether. There have been some 
reported instances in which defendants charged with non-felony offenses 
have had their incriminating statements, made without benefit of prior 
Miranda warnings, used against them in subsequent felony prosecu-
tions stemming from the same incident. 128 The ability to use statements 
obtained without Miranda warnings in this way could lead to somewhat 
unsavory police practices that might include arresting a suspect, 
deliberately charging him only with an offense not subject to Miranda 
warnings, obtaining incriminating statements, then charging the suspect 
with more serious offenses. 129 
There are also potential constitutional problems when a non-felony 
conviction, obtained as the result of non-Miranda incriminating custodial 
statements, is used to elevate the degree of a subsequent crime or to 
increase its sentence. 130 This situation might arise when a recidivist 
misdemeanant or traffic offender, 131 is convicted in a jurisdiction re-
quiring the degree of the subsequent_ conviction to be raised or an in-
in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against 
himself. That right cannot be abridged. 
Id. at 479 (citations omitted). 
127. Id. at 481 (emphasis added). 
128. See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976) (admitting incriminating state-
ment made after drunk driving arrest used in felony prosecution as an "habitual offender"); 
State v. Lewin, 163 N.J. Super. 439, 395 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1978), certification denied, 81 
N .J. 58, 404 A.2d 1157, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979) (admitting as evidence statement made 
in police headquarters following drunk driving arrest in prosecution for causing death by 
automobile). 
129. Cf. Casenote, Miranda Rules Are Not Applicable to Simple Misdemeanor Prosecutions, 
22 DRAKE L. REV. 184 (1972) (discussing State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1971), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972)). The commentator hypothesizes that a standard that did not 
apply Miranda to misdemeanors could allow prosecutors to remedy sloppy police work by pursu-
ing related misdemeanor, rather than felony, charges. Id. at 193 & n.53. 
130. This situation is analogous to the sixth amendment issue in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 
U.S. 222 (1980), in which the Court held that a prior misdemeanor conviction obtained without 
the benefit of assigned counsel, although permissible under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), 
could not be used to elevate a subsequent conviction for a similar offense to a felony. Justice 
Stewart's concurrence made clear that the defendant had been sentenced to an increased term 
of imprisonment soley because he had been convicted of a prior misdemeanor without the assistance 
of counsel. 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring). For a further discussion of the distinctions 
between the fifth and sixth amendment standards, see supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text. 
131. Such as the defendant in Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1980), who was convicted 
under the state "habitual offender" statute. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
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creased sentence to be imposed. 132 If one or more of the defendant's 
prior convictions was the result of statements obtained because the ques-
tioning officer determined not to give Miranda warnings, the defen-
dant could face a significant penalty due to statements made without 
the warnings. For this reason as well, the availability of the Miranda 
safeguards should not be conditioned on the severity of the offense 
or punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
Suspects charged with non-felony offenses in some cases face severe 
consequences. In addition to the potential loss of liberty, for however 
brief a time, there is also a risk that law enforcement officers will use 
statements from custodial questioning in misdemeanor and traffic of-
fense investigations to support felony convictions. Furthermore, courts 
might also use confessed non-felony offense violations to justify en-
hanced sentencing under "habitual off ender" statutes. These signifi-
cant consequences justify requiring Miranda warnings whenever suspects 
face· custodial interrogation, regardless of the severity of the offense. 
Because this practice is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings 
of the privilege against self- incrimination and the rationale of the Miran~ 
da decision, the extention of Miranda to non-felony custodial inter-
rogations should be foreclosed only by a compelling law enforcement 
interest. Requiring Miranda warnings in these cases would not be un-
duly burdensome to law enforcement and, as a bright line test, would 
be easy for police officers to apply. 133 Therefore, courts should recognize 
the importance of giving defendants warnings of their self-incrimination 
rights in all cases. 
-Kenneth W. Gaul 
132. See, e.g., VA. CODE§ 46.1-387.2, -387.6, -387.8. (1950) (imposing longer sentence in Clay). 
133. The Supreme Court has expressed a preference for bright line rules in this area, and 
in police practices generally. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983); Edwards 
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,484 (1981) (establishing a two-prong per se rule that, after the Miranda 
right to counsel had been asserted by an accused, further interrogation of the accused should not 
take place "unless the accused himself initiates further communication . . . with the police," 
and a valid waiver of the Miranda rights occurs); cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
213-14 (I 979) (holding that a "single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who 
have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests 
involved in the specific circumstances they confront"). 
